

**UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK**

FOR PUBLICATION

In re:

ALPER HOLDINGS USA, et al.

Chapter: 11

Case No.: 07-12148 (BRL)

Jointly Administered

Debtors.

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER ON OBJECTION OF ALPER HOLDINGS USA, INC. TO PROOFS OF CLAIM (CLAIM NOS. 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28) FILED BY THE ADKINS CLAIMANTS

Before the Court is the objection (the “Adkins Objection”) of Alper Holdings USA, Inc. (“Alper” or the “Debtor”) to certain claims (the “Adkins Claims”) filed by the Adkins Claimants¹, pursuant to section 502 of title 11 of the United States Code (the “Bankruptcy Code”) and Rule 3007 of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure (the “Bankruptcy Rules”). The Adkins Claimants oppose the Adkins Objection asserting that their claims have been sufficiently pled to put Alper on notice. For the reasons set forth below and in accordance with this Court’s previous Memorandum Decision on Objection of Alper to Proofs of Claim (Claim Nos. 29 and 21) filed by Flake Plaintiffs dated January 15, 2008 (the “Flake Opinion”) and

¹ The Adkins Claimants include Donald Adkins, Kristi Adkins, Hunter Adkins, Chad Beard, Patricia Beard, Emily Beard, Eric Christian, Peyton Christian, Jennifer Casteel, Timothy DeLoach, Kimberly DeLoach, Paxton DeLoach, Anthony Fambrough, Keysha Fambrough, Autumn Fambrough, Shonda Heflin, John Christopher Stiver, Sydney Stiver, David Heimbach, Jodie Heimbach, Cassidy Heimbach, Dawson Heimbach, Mason Heimbach, Scott Herkimer, Darcie Herkimer, Samuel Herkimer, Steven Jones, Melissa Jones, Mya Jones, Barry Piland, Christie Piland, Luke Piland, Travis Wood, Amy Wood and Lauren Wood (collectively, the “Adkins Plaintiffs”) as well as Priscilla Fowler and Jason Stewart -- who together filed proof of claim number 17 -- and James Dakota Stewart, Charity Comeaux, and Joshua Campbell -- who together filed proof of claim 27 (collectively, the “Non-Plaintiff Adkins Claimants” and, together with the Adkins Plaintiffs, the “Adkins Claimants”). The Non-Plaintiff Adkins Claimants are represented by the same counsel, and have filed substantially identical proofs of claim for personal injury/wrongful death claims, as the Adkins Plaintiffs. On information and belief, the Non-Plaintiff Adkins Claimants are asserting substantially similar claims as those asserted by the Adkins Plaintiffs and, accordingly, this Objection addresses the claims of all of the Adkins Claimants.

Memorandum Decision on Objection of Alper to Proofs of Claim Filed by (i) the Armstrong Plaintiffs and (ii) Holt Plaintiffs dated February 28, 2008 (the “Holt/Armstrong Opinion”),² this Court *once again* finds Alper cannot be held liable, directly or indirectly, for claims arising out of or relating to Saltire Industrial, Inc.’s (“Saltire”) alleged contamination or remediation in Dickson County, Tennessee. Therefore, the Adkins Claims are disallowed.

BACKGROUND

The Adkins Objection is the latest installment in a series of omnibus claims objections concerning claims based upon groundwater contamination that occurred in Dickson County, Tennessee in the mid-1960’s allegedly caused, in part, by Saltire (an indirect and incidental subsidiary of Alper). Having previously discussed the facts and circumstances preceding Alper’s bankruptcy at length not once, but twice, in both the Flake Opinion and the Holt/Armstrong Opinion, the Court presumes all parties are familiar with the facts and generally refers all parties to those opinions. Briefly, the Adkins Claimants, like the Flakes, Holts and Armstrongs before them, claim to have suffered personal injuries as a result of Saltire’s alleged contamination. From approximately 1964 until March 1985, Saltire operated a plant in Dickson County (the “Dickson Plant”) where it made automotive tire valves and associated products and where trichloroethylene (“TCE”) was used as a degreaser. The Dickson Plant ceased operations in March 1985. Since filing for bankruptcy on July 13, 2007, numerous parties have filed claims against Alper based on, among other things, Saltire’s alleged contamination in Dickson County.

² The parties stipulated at oral argument that in lieu of holding additional argument on the Adkins Claims, the parties would rely on the presentations made in connection with the hearing held on Alper’s objection to the claims of the Armstrong Plaintiffs (as defined below), which the parties mutually agreed consisted of substantially similar legal arguments to those presently at issue.

The Flake Opinion

On January 15, 2008, this Court issued the aforementioned Flake Opinion, which granted Alper's objection to certain claims asserted by Cathy and Ray Flake (together, the "Flake Plaintiffs") for personal and property damages based upon the alleged contamination in Dickson County.³ *In re Alper Holdings USA*, 07-12148 (BRL), 2008 WL 160203 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Jan. 15, 2008). In that instance, the Flake Plaintiffs claimed (the "Flake Claims") to have suffered personal and property damage due to the intentional or negligent failing of Alper (along with 20 other defendants) to "adequately monitor, control, supervise and/or maintain the disposal of the TCE at all locations throughout Dickson." As is presently the case, the Flake Plaintiffs alleged theories of both direct and indirect liability against Alper.

This Court granted Alper's objection and disallowed the Flake Claims based in large part upon the facts that (i) Alper's ownership interest in Saltire was not only indirect but also incidental as Alper only became the controlling shareholder of Saltire in connection with the reorganization of Saltire's parent First City Industries, Inc.⁴ ("First City") and (ii) Alper had no connection or relationship to Saltire or Dickson County prior to obtaining an indirect ownership interest in Saltire in 1992 – nearly two decades after the alleged contamination first occurred and at least seven years after the Dickson Plant was closed. Specifically, this Court found that Alper had no direct liability to the Flake Plaintiffs because (a) it was Saltire and not Alper that operated the Dickson Plant and, therefore, Alper owed no duty of care to the Flake Plaintiffs, and (b) the Flake Plaintiffs failed to set forth any facts that Alper actually participated in or oversaw

³ Curiously, despite the well-publicized contamination in Dickson County, the Flake Plaintiffs purchased property within 8 miles of the Dickson Plant in 2002 for use as a *water bottling facility*.

⁴ As a creditor of First City, Alper received shares of stock as a stock-for-debt distribution in the reorganized First City on account of its allowed claim pursuant to First City's plan of reorganization. *See Transcript of January 8, 2008 Hearing, at 25-26.*

Saltire's remediation in Dickson County that would support a finding that Alper may have assumed a duty of care to the Flake Plaintiffs. *Id.* at *4-5.

This Court also found that Alper had no indirect liability to the Flake Plaintiffs on either a theory of alter ego or piercing the corporate veil because neither the existence of a management agreement (the "Management Agreement") entered into between Saltire and Alper in 1995 whereby Alper agreed to oversee certain environmental issues nor a common employee between the parent and subsidiary would justify the extraordinary remedy of piercing the corporate veil as argued by the Flake Plaintiffs. *Id.* at *5-6. In so holding, the Court clearly held that "Alper cannot be held liable, directly or indirectly, for claims arising out of or relating to Saltire's alleged contamination or remediation in Dickson County, Tennessee." *Id.* at *7.

The Holt/Armstrong Opinion

Despite the clear and unambiguous holding set forth in the Flake Opinion, this Court was compelled to issue another decision on claims stemming out of the Dickson County contamination on February 25, 2008.⁵ In the Holt/Armstrong Opinion, *In re Alper Holdings USA*, 07-12148 (BRL), 2008 WL 541154 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Feb. 25, 2008), the Court was presented with two separate groups of claimholders, the Armstrong Plaintiffs⁶ and the Holt Plaintiffs⁷, both of whom sought to impose liability on Alper for both personal and property damages but under different theories of liability.

⁵ With the exception of the Holt Plaintiffs, the same law firm has represented each of the separate plaintiff groups.

⁶ The Armstrong Plaintiffs include Charlotte Armstrong and Jon Armstrong (together, the "Armstrong Plaintiffs").

⁷ The Harry Holt Plaintiffs include Harry Holt, Beatrice Holt, Sheila Holt-Orsted, Jasmine Orsted, Bonita Holt, O'Brian Holt, Brandon Holt, Patrick Holt, Bianca Bentley, Demetrius Holt and David Brown (collectively, the "Holt Plaintiffs").

A. The Armstrong Plaintiffs – Assumption of Duty Theory of Liability

In their amended pleadings,⁸ the Armstrong Plaintiffs sought to build upon the theory first introduced by the Flake Plaintiffs that Alper controlled the environmental remediation efforts in Dickson County (and assumed a duty to the Armstrong Plaintiffs) by further alleging that Nicholas Bauer, the same common employee of Saltire and Alper previously discussed in the Flake Opinion, oversaw the remediation on behalf of Alper.⁹ More precisely, the Armstrong Plaintiffs alleged that Mr. Bauer: (a) considered himself an employee of Alper and not Saltire, (b) was hired by Alper for the sole purpose of overseeing the remediation in Dickson County, (c) represented himself as an Alper official who had responsibility for environmental matters at Saltire, and (d) operated from an office in Virginia, a jurisdiction where only Alper and not Saltire was authorized to do business. Like the Flake Plaintiffs before them, the Armstrong Plaintiffs also pointed to the existence of the Management Agreement as proof that Alper had assumed control of the Dickson County remediation.

Alper objected to the Armstrong Plaintiffs' claims arguing that they were fundamentally the same negligent remediation claims the Court previously dispensed with in the Flake Opinion. Additionally, Alper contended that any claims for alter ego or successor liability should be

⁸ Apparently recognizing that their claims as originally filed (which only set forth damages stemming from the original contamination) would ultimately fail in light of the Flake Opinion, the Armstrong Plaintiffs' subsequently attempted to amend their proofs of claim to include allegations that Alper voluntarily assumed Saltire's remediation efforts in Dickson County and that Alper was negligent in conducting that remediation.

⁹ The Flake Plaintiffs previously alleged that Mr. Bauer was not an employee of Saltire at all, but rather was hired solely by Alper to deal with the remediation in Dickson County. The Court, however, previously held that not only was Mr. Bauer clearly an employee of Saltire (specifically, vice president of environmental affairs), but also that he was acting on behalf of Saltire and not Alper in overseeing or participating in the remediation in Dickson County. *In re Alper Holdings*, 2008 WL 160203, at *6.

disallowed because such claims were property of Saltire's bankruptcy estate and were released under Saltire's plan of reorganization (the "Saltire Plan").

In contrast, the Armstrong Plaintiffs argued that their claims should not be dismissed because, *inter alia*, (a) the Armstrong Plaintiffs' proofs of claim contained sufficient allegations to survive what they contend was a motion to dismiss, and (b) the Armstrong Plaintiffs' alter ego claims against Alper could not have been released under the Saltire Plan because their claims were not property of the estate.

This Court held that the Armstrong Plaintiffs, like the Flake Plaintiffs before them, had failed to allege any facts that would justify imposing liability on the part of Alper. Once again, this Court stressed that (a) the fact that a parent company (Alper) and its subsidiary (Saltire) shared common employees was insufficient to impose liability on the part of the parent for acts of the subsidiary; and (b) Alper's ownership interest in Saltire came about merely as a result of a debt to equity swap in First City's then pending chapter 11 bankruptcy – and the Court would not make use of such an incidental ownership interest to hold Alper indirectly liable for events that predated Alper's ownership interest in Saltire by nearly two decades. *In re Alper Holdings*, 2008 WL 541154, at *3-*4.

B. The Holt Plaintiffs – Alter Ego Theory of Liability

In contrast to the assumption of duty theory pursued by the Flake and Armstrong Plaintiffs, the Holt Plaintiffs alleged personal injury damages based entirely upon injuries caused by the original contamination in Dickson County and not by any subsequent remediation or negligence. Accordingly, the Holt Plaintiffs' allegations as they pertained to Alper were based entirely on a theory of alter ego liability.¹⁰

¹⁰ In addition to the causes of action asserted against Alper, the Holt Plaintiffs also alleged various causes of action against the city and county of Dickson, the commissioner of the Tennessee Department of Environment and Conservation, and the commissioner of the

The Holt Plaintiffs claimed that Alper was liable as the alter ego of Saltire because (a) Alper was not merely an indirect or incidental parent of Saltire as had been previously contended, but rather was formed for the sole purpose of acquiring First City during its then pending chapter 11 proceeding, (b) Alper dominated and controlled the management and direction of Saltire to a much greater extent than previously suggested, and (c) Alper and First City diverted assets away from Saltire and sold off many of Saltire's most profitable businesses, which left Saltire grossly undercapitalized and eventually necessitated Saltire filing for bankruptcy protection under chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code in August 2004.¹¹

Alper objected to the Holt Plaintiffs' alter ego and successor liability claims in the same fashion it had previously objected to similar claims by the Flake Plaintiffs charging that such claims should be disallowed because (i) any alter ego claims that Saltire may have had against Alper were property of the estate and were released under the Saltire Plan and (ii) even if such claims were not released pursuant to the Saltire Plan, no alter ego claims could be asserted against Alper because Saltire was a publicly traded company during the entire time that it operated the Dickson Plant and Alper did not exercise any dominion or control over Saltire's operations as required to support such claims.

The Holt Plaintiffs argued that their alter ego claims were not property of the estate but rather were nondebtor third party claims that Saltire was unable to release under the Saltire Plan because, *inter alia*, (a) under Tennessee law (which the Holt Plaintiffs argued controlled the analysis of alter ego claims rather than Delaware, the state of incorporation), a debtor did not have the ability to pierce its own corporate veil, and (b) the claims asserted by the Holt Plaintiffs

Tennessee Department of Health for, among other things, battery, nuisance and numerous civil rights violations.

¹¹ *In re Saltire Industrial, Inc.*, Case No. 04-15389 (BRL) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2004).

were personal to the Holt Plaintiffs and could not have been brought by Alper's body of creditors at large.

Although the Court previously declined to address whether Saltire's alter ego claims were property of the estate in the Flake Opinion, *see In re Alper Holdings*, 2008 WL 160203, at * 6, it was clear based upon the conduct alleged by the Holt Plaintiffs that such alter ego claims were of a generalized nature and did not allege a "particularized injury" specific only to the Holt Plaintiffs. Accordingly, this Court held that such alter ego claims were in fact property of Saltire's bankruptcy estate and were, therefore, released under section 13.1 of the Saltire Plan.¹² *In re Alper Holdings*, 2008 WL 541154, at *6. As can be seen from the following, the prior holding regarding the Holt Plaintiffs' alter ego claims applies equally to the current Adkins Claimants.

¹² Section 13.1(b) of the Saltire Plan states, in pertinent part:

The Debtor . . . acquires and forever discharges Alper . . . from any and all actions, causes of action, [and] liabilities . . . in any way relating to the Debtor . . . that the Debtor could assert directly or any Holder of a Claim . . . could assert derivatively or on behalf of the Debtor or its estate Notwithstanding the foregoing, the above release does not release claims any nondebtor third party may hold against any of the Released Parties, except to the extent any nondebtor third party is asserting a claim that is property of the Debtor's Estate.

THE ADKINS CLAIMS

On or about September 19, 2007, the Adkins Claimants filed their original proofs of claim asserting contingent, unliquidated, and disputed personal injury and wrongful death claims (the “Original Adkins Claims”). The Original Adkins Claims were based entirely upon a complaint (the “Adkins Complaint”) filed by the Adkins Claimants on or about January 9, 2006 against Alper, asserting various claims for personal injuries based upon both direct and indirect theories of liability. Before proceeding, the Court notes the following: (a) despite counsel for the Adkins Claimants’ (the “Esserman Firm”) repeated efforts at differentiating the physical injuries sustained by his clients, the personal injuries allegedly suffered by the Adkins Claimants are nearly identical in all respects to those previously before the Court; and (b) the Adkins Complaint is completely devoid of any allegations of negligent remediation on the part of Alper or claims that Alper assumed a duty of care to the Adkins Claimants. In fact, except for the statements that Alper was liable for its “own direct acts and omission” and as a “successor-in-interest” to Saltire, the Adkins Complaint does not set forth a single specific allegation that would warrant imposing liability on the part of Alper.

On February 28, 2007, Alper filed the Adkins Objection alleging that the Original Adkins Claims were both baseless and facially deficient for all of the same reasons set forth in their previous claims objections, namely that: (a) Alper had no connection or relationship to Dickson County or the Dickson Plant prior to becoming Saltire’s indirect and incidental parent and, therefore, Alper owed no duty of care to the Adkins Claimants; (b) the Adkins Claimants had made no showing aside from the general statement that Alper was being sued based on its “own direct acts and omission” that Alper had engaged in any negligent remediation efforts in Dickson County; and (c) to the extent that the Adkins Claimants were attempting to assert alter ego claims against Alper (like the Flakes, Holts and Armstrong Plaintiffs before them), such claims must be

disallowed because (i) the Court had previously ruled in the Holt/Armstrong Opinion that such claims were property of the estate and released under the Saltire Plan; and (ii) even if such claims were not released under the Saltire Plan, Alper did not exercise any dominion or control over Saltire's operations.

Following the previous dismissal of the Flake and Armstrong Claims as a matter of law, the Esserman Firm reacted on behalf of the Adkins Claimants by attempting to amend the Original Adkins Claims nearly one month after Alper filed the Adkins Objection (the "New Adkins Claims").¹³ In the New Adkins Claims and the Adkins Claimants' response to the Adkins Objection (the "Adkins Response"), the Esserman Firm attempts *once again* to resurrect the very same assumption of duty theory this Court previously put to rest in the Flake Opinion and the Holt/Armstrong Opinion. Specifically, the Adkins Response states as follows:

While the Debtor was not involved in the initial contamination in Dickson, the Debtor assumed control of the TCE remediation efforts after its acquisition of Saltire in 1992. The Debtor conducted such remediation in a negligent manner by failing to properly contain the contamination and by allowing the ongoing migration of TCE contaminants to Dickson-area drinking water—thereby causing the Adkins Claimants' injuries.

See Adkins Response, at p. 2.

In addition to the assumption of duty theory (which by the Adkins Claimants own admission is their sole bases for imposing direct liability on Alper), the Adkins Claimants also contend – in direct contravention to this Court's holding in the Holt/Armstrong Opinion – that their alter ego claims against Alper were not property of Saltire's bankruptcy estate and could not be released under the Saltire Plan.

¹³ Alper has objected to the filing of the New Adkins Claims as an impermissible amendment to the Original Adkins Claims as they were filed nearly six months after the expiration of the September 21, 2007 bar date. *See Objection of Alper Holdings USA to Amendment of Proofs of Claim (Claim Nos. 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28) Filed by Adkins Claimants dated April 2, 2008*, at ¶ 3.

It is clear from the pleadings before the Court that the Adkins Claimants intend to rely exclusively on the new allegations as set forth in the New Adkins Claims. In response, Alper argues in well grounded fashion that exclusive reliance on the New Adkins Claims is tantamount to a concession that the Original Adkins Claims were deficient as pled. Regardless, the New Adkins Claims may very well be impermissible amendments to the Original Adkins Claims because they are based on a set of facts and theories of legal liability completely different than those asserted in the Original Adkins Claims and there is no equitable reasons to permit the late-filed claims because the Adkins Claims “whether in the amended form or in [their] essential form still [do] not state a plausible, cognizable legal claim under the prevailing law.” *See Transcript of Hearing Regarding Alper Holdings USA, Inc.’s Objection to Claims of the Harry Holt Plaintiffs and the Armstrong Plaintiffs*, dated February 21, 2007, at p. 17.

DISCUSSION

Alper Has No Direct Liability to the Adkins Claimants

To establish a direct cause of action against Alper, the Adkins Claimants must prove that Alper owed a duty to the Adkins Claimants, that the duty was breached, and that the breach was the cause in fact and proximate cause of the Adkins Claimants’ injuries. *See Ham v. Hospital of Morristown, Inc.*, 917 F. Supp. 531, 534 (E.D. Tenn. 1995) (“The law is well settled in Tennessee that, in a cause of action for negligence, there must first be a duty of care owed by the defendant to the plaintiff.”). Recognizing that Alper had no connection or relationship to Saltire or Dickson County prior to obtaining an indirect ownership interest in Saltire nearly two decades after the alleged contamination first occurred and at least seven years after the Dickson Plant closed, the Adkins Claimants now rely solely on their theory that Alper controlled the remediation in Dickson County and assumed a duty of care to the Adkins Claimants to impose direct liability on Alper.

Under Tennessee law, the so-called “Good Samaritan” rule is embodied in Section 324A of the Restatements, which provides:

One who undertakes, gratuitously or for consideration, to render services to another which he should recognize as necessary for the protection of a third person or his things, is subject to liability to the third person for physical harm resulting from his failure to exercise reasonable care to protect his undertaking, if

- (a) his failure to exercise reasonable care increases the risk of such harm, or
- (b) he has undertaken to perform a duty owed by the other to the third person, or
- (c) the harm is suffered because of reliance of the other or the third person upon the undertaking.

Restatement (Second) of Torts § 324A (1965).

It is on the second prong of this test – that Alper undertook to perform a duty of Saltire when it assumed control over the remediation in Dickson County – that the Adkins Claimants rest their hat.

In support of this theory, however, the Esserman Firm (who previously served both as counsel for the Flake Plaintiffs and the Armstrong Plaintiffs) does not offer a single shred of new evidentiary support. Indeed, the Adkins Claimants rely on the same arguments previously submitted by the Flake and Armstrong Plaintiffs which were reviewed and dispensed with by this Court, namely the mere existence of the Management Agreement and a common employee (Mr. Bauer) involved in the remediation. As previously discussed in the Flake Opinion and the Holt/Armstrong Opinion, however, these facts alone are insufficient to impose liability on Alper.

See In re Alper Holdings, 2008 WL 160203, at *5-6; *In re Alper Holdings*, 2008 WL 541154, at *3.

The fact that a parent company and its subsidiary share common employees is insufficient to impose liability on the part of the parent for acts of the subsidiary. *See United States v.*

Bestfoods, 524 U.S. 51, 69 (1998) (“[I]t is entirely appropriate for directors of a parent corporation to serve as directors of its subsidiary, and that fact alone may not serve to expose the parent corporation to liability for its subsidiary's acts.”) (internal quotations omitted). Courts generally presume overlapping directors are acting on behalf of the subsidiary and not the parent company when acting for the subsidiary absent extraordinary circumstances. *Bestfoods*, 524 U.S. at 69-71.

Despite the fact that the Esserman Firm is now attempting this argument for the third time, the Court remains unpersuaded. The Adkins Claimants have failed to provide any support either to rebut the legal presumption that Mr. Bauer was acting on behalf of Saltire and not Alper in overseeing the Dickson County remediation or to support their claim that Alper participated (negligently or otherwise) in the remediation. Accordingly, the Court sees no reason to part ways with the rationale set forth in the Flake and Holt/Armstrong Opinions. *See, e.g., In re Manhattan Invest. Fund Ltd.*, 343 B.R. 63, 67 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (“The law of the case is a discretionary doctrine, providing ‘that where a court decides upon a rule of law, that decision should continue to govern the same issues in subsequent stages in the same case.’” While the law of the case is “a discretionary doctrine which does not constitute a limitation on the court's power but merely expresses the general practice of refusing to reopen what has been decided,” nevertheless, the situations justifying reconsideration are generally limited to “an intervening change of controlling law, the availability of new evidence, or the need to correct a clear error or prevent manifest injustice.”) (internal citations omitted); *641 Ave. of Americas Ltd. Partnership v. 641 Associates, Ltd.*, 189 B.R. 583, 588 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (“[U]nder the law of the case doctrine, a decision on an issue of law becomes binding precedent in subsequent stages of the same litigation.”).

Alper Has No Indirect Liability to the Adkins Claimants

Despite this Court's prior opinions, the Adkins Claimants argue in the alternative that Alper is indirectly liable to the Adkins Claimants on the basis that Saltire was an alter ego of Alper during the negligent remediation of the Dickson Plant. The Court does not see any benefit in revisiting this issue again except to draw the Adkins Claimants' attention to that portion of the Holt/Armstrong Opinion which states as follows:

While this Court previously did not address whether Saltire's alter ego claims were property of the estate, *see In re Alper Holdings*, 2008 WL 160203, at * 6, it is clear based upon the conduct presently alleged that such alter ego claims were in fact property of Saltire's bankruptcy estate and, accordingly, that those alter ego claims were released under section 13.1 of the Saltire Plan. Accordingly, the Holt Claims are disallowed.

In re Alper Holdings, 2008 WL 541154, at *4.

"Where a claim is generalized, with no particularized injury stemming from it and where the claim may be brought by any creditor, the trustee or debtor-in-possession is the appropriate party to assert the claim and creditors are subject to the outcome of the action brought by the trustee or debtor-in-possession." *In re Enron Corp.*, 2003 WL 1889040, at *4; *see also Murray v. Miner*, 876 F. Supp. 512, 516 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (An alter ego claim "belongs to the trustee if (1) under governing state law the debtor could have asserted an alter ego claim to pierce its own corporate veil, and (2) plaintiffs' claim is a general one, of the type that could be brought by any creditor of the debtor.").

Despite their contentions, the injuries asserted by the Adkins Claimants are not particularized or unique and could have properly been brought by Saltire or Saltire's general body of creditors. Accordingly, Alper has no indirect liability to the Adkins Claimants on a theory of alter ego liability.

28 U.S.C. §§ 157(b)(2) and (b)(5)

Finally, the Adkins Claimants argue that the Debtor's Motion to Dismiss is an impermissible attempt to bypass Congress's command that personal injury claims be tried in the District Court. This argument is without merit.

Section 157(b)(2) of title 28 of the United States Code, which outlines a non-exhaustive laundry list of matter that fall within the category of "core" proceedings, specifically excludes from the definition of core the "liquidation or estimation of contingent or unliquidated personal injury or wrongful death claims against the estate for purposes of distribution in a case under title 11." 11 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2). Section 157(b)(5) goes to say that "the district court shall order that personal injury tort and wrongful death claims shall be tried in the district court in which the bankruptcy case is pending...." 11 U.S.C. § 157(b)(5). However, as previously stated on the record at the hearing denying the Adkins Claimants' application for a stay pending the determination of their motion before the District Court to withdraw the bankruptcy reference, this matter does not concern "the liquidation or estimation of contingent or unliquidated personal injury tort or wrongful death claims" so as to implicate Section 157(b)(2)(B), but rather merely concerns the allowance or disallowance of timely filed proofs of claim as a matter of law. *See Transcript from Hearing on Motion for Stay Pending Motion of the Personal Injury Claimants dated March 25, 2008, at pp. 25-26 (emphasis supplied).*

Alper has objected to the Adkins Claims (as reformulated in the New Adkins Claims) as legally insufficient, and courts in this Circuit have repeatedly held that proceedings to determine the allowance or disallowance of claims are core matters. *See Gulf States Exploration Co. v. Manville Forest Prods. Corp. (In re Manville Forest Prods. Corp.),* 896 F.2d 1384, 1389 (2d Cir. 1990); *Enron Power Mktg., Inc. v. Nevada Power Co. (In re Enron Corp.),* No. 03-09332, 2004 WL 3015256, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 28, 2004); *In re Chateaugay Corp.*, 111 B.R. 67, 76 (Bankr.

S.D.N.Y. 1990) (“the bankruptcy court must have jurisdiction to make the threshold determination of whether as a matter of law, a claim exists which can be asserted against the debtor, even if that claim sounds in personal injury or wrongful death”) (emphasis supplied).

Therefore, as this matter is clearly within this Court’s “core” jurisdiction, the Adkins Claimants’ argument that the Debtor is attempting to impermissibly side-step the District Court is without merit.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above and for the reasons set forth in the Flake Opinion and the Holt/Armstrong Opinion, the Court finds that Alper cannot be held liable, directly or indirectly, for claims arising out of or relating to Saltire’s alleged contamination or remediation in Dickson County, Tennessee. Therefore, the Adkins Claims are disallowed and expunged.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: New York, New York
April 3, 2008

/s/ Burton R. Lifland
The Honorable Burton R. Lifland
United States Bankruptcy Judge